Tkis edition ■/'» jjubl/'>s/ieJ ht/ upecUd mbscrlptioii. (anl 5.000 coplcx: Jti/v? 
■ leen 'plar^ed at tlic (Jlftpoml of tlte United States Sais-itary Commisi'iox. 
All Ageiiti< of the Commitisian are earnestly requested to give it the widest 
c initiation througliorit the Army and Xavy. 



HOW A FEBB PBOPLE 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR: 



Clnipttr from ^itglisb pistoru. 



CJHAE.LES J. STILLE. 



" IJi«(,ory, if it be not the merest toy, tlie idlest pastime of ouv vacant liours. 
is flie recoi'd of tlie onward niareli of Humanity towards an eud. Where there 
is no belief iu sncli an end, and tliereforo no advance towards it, ]io stirring's of 
a Divine Word iii a people's bosom, wliere not as yet the beast's heart has been 
taken away, and a man's heart given, there history cannot be said to be. Tlaev 
l)(;long- n(»t, lliereibre, to History, Icasl- of all to sacred History, those Babels, 
iJiose cities of confusion, those huge pens, into Avhich by force and fraud, the 
early hunters of men, the iS'imrods and the Sesostrises drave, and compelled 
their fellows : and Scripture is only most true to its idea while it passes them 
almost or wholly in silence by, while it lingers rather on the plains of Mamre 
with the man that ' believed God and it was coimted unto him for righteons- 
uesw,' than by 'populous No' or great Babylon, where no faith existed but iu 
the blind powers of nature, and the brute forces of the natural man." 

Trench's Hulsean Lecture, 

The Unity of Scripbire, 



NEW YORK : 

ANSON I) . F . RANDOLPH, 

No. 8 3 BROADWAY 

18GS. 



J 









■ f 

HOW A FREE PEOPLE 
CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 



We have known hitherto in this country so little 
of the actual realities of war on a grand scale, that 
many are beginning to look upon the violent oppo- 
sition to the Government, and the slowness of tllo pro- 
gress of our arras, as sigiifl of hopeless vliscuarage- 
ment. History, however, shows us that these are the 
inevitable incidents of all wars waged by a free peo- 
ple. This might be abundantly illustrated by many 
remarkable events in English history, from the days 
of the great Kebellion down through the campaigns 
of the Prince of Orange and of Marlborough, to the 
wars which grew out of the events of the French Re- 
volution. War is always entered upon amidst a vast 
deal of popular enthusiasm, which is utterly unreason- 
ing. It' is the universal voice of history, that such 
enthusiasm is wholly unreliable in supporting the pro- 
longed and manifold burdens which are inseparable 
from every war waged on an extensive scale, and for a 
long period. The popular idea of war is a speedy 
and decisive victory and an immediate occupation of 
the enemy's capital, followed by a treaty of peace by 
which the objects of the war are permanently secured. 
Nothing is revealed to the excited passions of the 



4 HOW A FEEE PEOPLE 

multitude, but dazzling visions of national glory, pur- 
chased by small privations, and the early and com- 
plete subjugation of their enemies. It is, therefore, 
not unnatural that at the first reverse they should 
yield at once to an unmanly depression, and, giving up 
all for lost, they should vent upon the Government for 
its conduct of the war, and upon the army and its 
generals for their failure to make their dreams of vic- 
tory realities, an abuse as unreasoning as was their 
original enthusiasm. 

Experience has taught the English people that the 
progress of a war never fulfils the popular expecta- 
tions ; that although victory may be assured at last to 
patient and untiring vigor and energy in its prosecu- 
tion, yet during the continuance of a long war, there 
can be no well-founded hope of a uniform and constant 
series of brilliant triumphs in the field, illustrating the 
profound wisdom of the policy of the Cabinet ; that, 
on the contrary, all war, even that which is most suc- 
cessful in the end, consists rather in checkered for- 
tunes, of alternations of victory and disaster, and that 
its conduct is generally marked by what were evi- 
dently, when viewed in the light of experience, blun- 
ders so glaring in the policy adopted by the Govern- 
ment, or in the strategy of its generals, that the won- 
der is success was achieved at all. The English have 
thus been taught that the true characteristic of public 
opinion, in its judgment of a war, should be, not so 
much hopefulness or impatience of immediate results, 
but rather a stern endurance — that King-quality of 
heroic constancy which, rooted deep in a profound 
conviction of the justice of the cause, supports a lofty 



CONDUCT A LONG WAE. §f 

public spirit e:^ually well in the midst of temporary- 
disaster, and in the hour of assured triumph. 

We have had no such experience here. Our people 
are perhaps more easily excited by success, and more 
readily depressed by reverses, than the English, and it 
is, therefore, worth while to consider how they carried 
on war on a large scale and for a protracted period. 
It will be 'found, if we mistake not, that the denuncia- 
tions of the Government, so common among us of late, 
and the complaints of the inactivity of the army, kave 
their exact counterpart in the history of the progress 
of all the wars in which England has been engaged 
since the days of the great Kebellion. He who draws 
consolation from the lessons of the past, will not, we 
think, seek comfort in vain when he discovers tliat in 
all those wars in which, the Government and the army 
have been so bitterly assailed, (except that of the Am- 
erican Revolution,) England has at last been trinmpli- 
ant. It is worth while, tben, to look into English 
history to underetand how war is successfully carried 
on, notwithstanding the obstacles which, owing to a 
perverted public opinion, exist within the nation itself. 
These difficulties, although they inhere in the very 
nature of a free government, often prove, as we shall 
see, more fruitful of embarrassment to the favorable 
prosecution of a war, than the active operations of the 
enemy. 

We propose to illustrate the propositions which we 
have advanced, by a study of the series of campaigns 
known in English history as the Peninsular War. We 
select this particular war because we think that in 
many of its events, and in the policy which sustained 



6 HOW A FKEE PEOPLE 

it, there are to be observed many important, almost 
startling parallelisms with our present struggle. "We 
have, of course, no reference to any similarity existing 
in the principle which produced the two wars, but 
rather to the striking resemblance in the modes adopt- 
ed by the two people for prosecuting war on a grand 
scale, and for the vindication of a principle regarded 
as of vital importance by them. 

The Peninsular War, on the part of England, as was 
contended by the ministry during its progress, and as 
is now universally recognised, was a struggle not only 
to maintain her commercial supremacy, (which was 
then, as it is now, her life,) but also to protect her own 
soil from invasion by the French, by transferring the 
scene of conflict to distant Spain, The general purpose 
of assisting the alliance against Napoleon seems always 
to have been a subordinate motive. It is now admit- 
ted by all historians, that upon success in this war de- 
pended not only England's rank among nations, but 
her very existence as an independent people. The 
war was carried on for more than five years, and on a 
scale, so far as the number of men and the extent of 
the military operations are concerned, until then whol- 
ly unattempted by England in her European wars. 
The result, as it need not be said, was not only to 
crown the British arms with the most brilliant and un- 
dying lustre, but also to retain permanently in their 
places the party whose only title to public favor was 
that they had carried on the war against the most seri- 
ous obstacles, and brought it to a successful termina- 
tion. Thus was delayed, it may be remarked, for at 
least twenty years, the adoption of those measures of 



CONDUCT A LONG WAE. 7 

reform wliicli at last gave to England that place in 
modern civilization which had long before been reach- 
ed by most of the nations of the Continent by passing 
through the trials of a bloody revolution. If we, then, 
in our dark hours, are inclined to doubt and despond- 
ency as to the final result, let us not forget the ordeal 
through which England successfully passed. We shall 
find that, in the commencement, there was the same 
wild and unreasoning enthusiasm with which we are 
familiar ; the same bitter abuse and denunciation of the 
Government at the first reverses ; the same impatient 
and ignorant criticism of military operations ; the same 
factious and disloyal opposition on the part of a pow- 
erful party ; the same discouragement and desponden- 
cy at times on the part of the true and loyal ; the 
same prophecies of the utter hopelessness of success ; 
the same complaints of grievous and burdensome taxa- 
tion, and predictions of the utter financial ruin of the 
country; the same violent attacks upon the Govern- 
ment for its arbitrary decrees, and particularly for the 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus '^ the same 
difficulties arising from the inexperience of the army ; 
and the game weakness on the part of the Government 
in not boldly and energetically supporting the army in 
the field. These are some of the more striking paral- 
lelisms between the Peninsular War and our own 
struggle, which a slight sketch of the progress of that 
war will render very apparent. 

The insurrection in Spain which followed immedi- 
ately upon a knowledge of the intrigues of Napoleon 
at Bayonne, in April, 1807, by which the royal family 
was entrapped into an abdication of its rights to the 



'8 ■ HOW A FEEE PEv I?LE 

throne, and Joseph Bonaparte made king of that coun- 
try, roused universal admiration and enthusiasm in 
England. It was thought by all parties that an obsta- 
cle to the further progress of Napoleon's schemes of 
the most formidable character had at last been found. 
It was the first j)opular insurrection in any country 
against Napoleon's power, and consequently, when the 
deputies from the Asturias reached England imploring 
succor, their appeals excited the popular feeling to the 
highest pitch, and the opposite parties in Parliament 
and the country vied with each other in demanding 
that England should aid the insmTection with the 
whole of her military power. It is curious to observe, 
that when the question of aid was brought before Par- 
liament, Mr. Canning and Mr. Sheridan, who had prob- 
ably never acted together before on any political ques- 
tion, rivalled each other in their praise of the Span- 
iards, and in their expressions of hope and belief that 
Napoleon had at last taken a step which would speed- 
ily prove fatal to him. Large supplies were voted by 
acclamation, and an important expedition, afterwards 
operating in two columns, one under the command of 
Sir John Moore, the other under that of Sir Arthur 
"Wellesley, was dispatched to the Peninsula to aid the 
insurgents. It is not our purpose to trace the progress 
of this expedition, but merely to notice the effect which 
its immediate results, the retreat to Corunna, and the 
Convention of Cintra, produced upon popular feeling 
in England. As we look back on the history of that 
time, the folly and madness which seized upon the pop- 
ular mind when the terms of the Convention of Cintra 
became known, can only be explained by recalling the 



CONDUCT ,A LONG WAR. 9 

higli-wrouglit and extravagant expectations of immedi- 
ate success with wliicli the war liad been entered upon. 
By this Convention, and as the results of a single bat- 
tle, Portugal was wholly evacuated by the French ; yet 
such were the unreasonable demands of public opinion, 
that because the whole French army had not been 
made prisoners of war, the Ministry v/as almost swept 
away by the outburst, and it could only control the 
storm by removing the two generals highest in rank. 
It required all the family and political influence of the 
third, Sir Arthur Wellesley, to enable him to retain 
his position in the army. The disastrous retreat of 
Sir John Moore's army to Corunna, and the easy tri- 
umphs of the French at that period throughout all 
Spain, plunged the English into despair. Going from 
one extreme to another, men who, only three months 
before, had quarrelled with the army in Portugal be- 
cause it had not given them the spectacle of a French 
marshal and twenty thousand of his soldiers as prison- 
ers of war at Spithead, now spoke openly of the folly 
of any attempt at all on the part of the English" to re- 
sist the progress of the French arms in the Peninsula. 
In Parliament there was the usual lame apology for 
disaster, an attempt to shift the res^^onsibility from the 
Ministry to the General in command ; but the great 
fact, that all their hopes had been disappointed still 
remained, and after the explanations of the Govern- 
ment the general despondency became more gloomy 
than ever. . It is not difficult in the light of history to 
see where the blame of failure should rest. Any one 
who is disposed now to sneer and cavil at the short- 
comings of our own adminiaStration, to impute to it 



10 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

views sliort-sighted and impracticable in their policy, 
and to blame it for want of energy and vigor in the 
prosecution of the war, has only to tm*n to Colonel 
Napier's account of the stupid blunders of the English 
government, its absurd and contradictory orders, its 
absolute ignorance not only of the elementary princi- 
ples of all war, but of the very nature of the country 
in which the army was to operate, and of the resources 
of the enemy, to be convinced that had its mode of 
carrying on hostilities, (which was the popular one,) 
been adopted, in six months not an English soldier 
would have remained in the Peninsula except as a 
prisoner of war. The history of this campaign con- 
tains important lessons for us ; it shows conclusively 
that the immediate results of war are never equal to 
the public expectation, and that if this public expecta- 
tion, defeated by the imbecility of the Government, or 
soured by disaster in the field, is to be the sole rule by 
which military operations are to be judged, no war for 
the defence of a principle can long be carried on. 

Fortunately for the fame and the power of England, 
the Ministry, although ignorant of the true mode of 
prosecuting hostilities, had sense enough to perceive 
that their only true policy was perseverance. They 
were strong enough to resist the formidable opposition 
which the events we have referred to developed in 
Parliament and the country, and, undismayed by the 
experience of the past, concluded a treaty with the 
Provisional Government of Spain, by which they 
pledged England never to abandon the national cause 
until the French were driven across the Pyrenees. The 
army was placed upon a better foe ting, was largely re 



CONDUCT A LONG WAE. 11 

inforced, and Sir Arthur Wellesley was appointed to 
the chief command. The Government, not yet wholly 
awakened from its illusions, still thought it practicable 
to reach Madrid in a single campaign, and to that end 
the efforts of Wellington were directed. It became 
necessary first to dislodge Soult at Oporto, and the 
magnificent victory of the English, gained by the pas- 
sage of the Douro at that point, went far to revive 
confidence at home in the invincibility of their army. 
Yet so clear is it that victory in war often depends 
upon what, for some better name, we may call mere 
good fortune, that we have the authority of the Duke 
of Wellington himself for saying, that this army, 
which, had just exhibited such prodigies of valor, was 
then in such a state of demoralization, that although 
" excellent on parade, excellent to fight, it was worse 
than an enemy in a country, and liable to dissolution 
alike by success or defeat." Certainly no severer criti- 
cism. has ever been justified by the inexperience and 
want of discipline of our own raw levies than that 
contained in this memorable declaration. A little re- 
flection and candor might teach us, as it did the Eng- 
lish, that nothing can compensate for the want of experi- 
ence, and that every allowance is to be made for disas- 
ters where it is necessary to educate both ofi[icers and 
soldiers in the actual presence of the enemy. Welling- 
ton soon afterwards moved towards the Spanish fron- 
tier, hoping by a junction with the army under Cuesta 
to fight a battle with the French, which would open to 
him the road to the capital. The battle was fought at 
Talavera, and although it has since been claimed by 
the English as one of tlieir proudest victories, and the 



12 HOW A TEE 5 PEOPLE 

name of Talaveea .is now inscribed upon the stand- 
ards of tlie regiments who took part in it with those 
of Salamanca and Yittoria, yet the result was in the 
end, that Wellington was obliged to retreat to Lisbon, 
just three months after he had set out from that place, 
having left his wounded in the hands of the French, 
having escaped as if by a miracle from being wholly 
cut off in his retreat, and having lost one-third of his 
army in battle and by diseaise. Of course, the blame 
was thrown upon the want of cooperation on the part 
of the Spaniards. This we have nothing to do with ; 
it is the result of the campaign with which we are con- 
cerned. Dependence upon the Spaniards was certain- 
ly, as it turned out, a fault, but it was one of the fair 
chances of war, and it was a fault in which Welling- 
ton, made wise by experience, was never again detected. 
When the news of the untoward result of this cam- 
paign reached England, the clamor against the Got- 
ernment and against W^ellington was quite as violent 
as that excited by the disasters of Sir John Moore's 
army. The opposition in Parliament took advantage 
of this feeling to rouse public opinion to such a mani- 
ifestation as might compel the termination of the war 
in the^ Peninsula, and drive the Ministry from office. 
The Common Council of London, probably a fair ex- 
ponent of the opinions of the middle class, petition- 
ed the King not to confirm the grant of £2,000 
year, which the Ministry had succeeded in getting Par- 
liament to vote to Wellington. The petitioners ridi- 
culed the idea that a battle attended with such results 
should be called a victory. " It should rather be called 
a calamity^'' they said, " since we were obliged to seek 



CONDUCT A LONO "WAE. 



safety in a precipitate flight, abandoning many thou- 
sands of ouv wounded countrymen into tne hands ot 
the French " In the opinion of the strategists m the 
Common Council and of their friends in Parhament, 
Wellington might be a brave ofScer, but he was no 
general; he had neglected the protection of his flanks 
and his line of communication. When it is remember- 
ed that at this vefy time, Wellington, profiting by the 
experience of the past, was diligently making his army 
reallv efl'ective within the lines of Torres Vedras from 
which stronghold it was in due time to sally forth Ijke 
a ciant refreshed, never to rest until it had planted the 
Enc^lish flag on the heights of Toulouse, we may per- 
haps smile at the presumption of those who, sincere 
well-wishers to the cause, displayed only their igno- 
rance in their criticism. But what shall be said of 
those who, knowing better, ^'ei^g ^lf « f ^ "^^ 
stand the wisdom of the policy adopted by the Gene- 
ralto insure success in the stupendous enterprise m 
which the coimtry was engaged, yet with a factious 
spirit, and with the sole object of getting into power 
themselves, took advantage of the excxtement of the 
icnorant multitude to paralyze the energies of the Gov- 

ernment? -, ,, 

That hideous moral leprosy, which seems to be the 
sad but invariable attendant upon all political discus- 
slons in a free government, corrupting the very sources 
of public life, breeding only the base spmt of faction 
Ld taken complete possession of the opposition, and 
in its sordid calculations, the dishonor of the country, 
or the danger of the army, was as nothing provided 
the office, the power, and the patronage of the Govern- 



14 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

ment were secured in their hands. It was of little 
concern to them, provided they could drive the Minis- 
try from office, whether its downfall was brought about 
by blunders in Spain, or by the King's obstinacy 
about Catholic Emancipation, or by an obscure quarrel 
about the influence of the Lords of the bed-chamber. 
The sincerity of these declamations of the opposition 
was curiously enough put to the test some time after- 
wards, when the Ministry, wearied by the factious 
demagogueism with which all their measures were as- 
sailed, and understanding perfectly their significance, 
boldly challenged their opponents, if they were in 
earnest, to make a definite motion in the House of 
Commons, that Portugal should be abandoned to its 
fate. This move completely unmasked their game, 
and for a time silenced the clamor, for it was perfect- 
ly understood on all hands, that deep in the popular 
heart, undisturbed by th^ storms which swept over its 
surface, there was a thorough and abiding conviction 
of the absolute necessity of resisting the progress of 
Napoleon's arms, and that the real safety of England 
herself required that that resistance should then be 
made in Spain. Still this noisy clamor did immense 
mischief; it weakened the Government, it prolonged 
the strife, it alarmed the timid, it discouraged the true, 
and it so far imposed upon Napoleon himself, that think- 
ing that in these angry invectives against the Govern- 
ment he found the real exponent of English sentiment, 
lie concluded, not unnaturally, that the people we/e 
tired and disgusted with the war, and that the prirar 
tions which it occasioned were like a cancer, slowly bnt 
snrely eating out the sources of national life. 



CONDUCT A LONG WAE. 15 

In tlie midst of tliese violent tumults at home, 
Wellington was silently preparing for his great work 
within the lines of Torres Veclras. It would not be 
easy to overrate the difficulties by which he was sur- 
rounded. He wa^ fully aware of the outcry which 
had been raised against him ; he knew that from a 
Cabinet weakened by internal dissensions, and on the 
verge of overthrow from the vigorous assaults of the 
opposition, and from its own unpopularity occasioned by 
the failure of the Walcheren expedition, and the disasters 
in the Peninsula, he could expect no thorough and re- 
liable support. Indeed, the Government, almost in des- 
pair, threw the whole responsibility for the military mea- 
sures on the Continent on him alone. He accepte'l 
the responsibility in a most magnanimous spirit. " 1 
conceive," he writes, " that the honor and the interests 
of the country require that we should hold our posi- 
tion here as long as possible, and please Grod, I will 
maintain it as long as I can, I will neither endeavor 
to shift from my own shoulders on those of the Minis- 
ters the responsibility for the failure, by calling for 
means which I know they cannot give, and which per- 
haps would not add materially to the facility of attain- 
ing our ^object ; nor will I give to the Ministers, who 
are not strong, and who must feel the delicacy of their 
own situation, an excuse for withdrawing the army 
from a position which in my opinion, the honor and 
interest of the country require they should maintain 
as long as possible." Animated by this heroic sense 
of duty, the Commander-in-Chief prepared to contend 
against the 200,000 men under Massena, whom Napo- 
leon had sent to chase him into the sea. He had, to 



16 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

Oppose this immense force, only 25,000 English soldiers, 
and about the same number of Portuguese, tolerably 
organized. Secure within the lines of Torres Vedras, 
he quietly waited until the want of provisions, and 
the utter hopelessness of an assault upon his position 
forced upon Massena the necessity of retreating. Then 
instantly pursuing, in a series of battles, of almost 
daily occurrence, he drove Massena out of Portugal, 
and reached once more the Spanish frontier in May, 
1811, nearly three years after the English had sent an 
army to the assistance of the Peninsula. Here he 
rested for a long time, making preparations for the 
siege of Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo, operations re- 
quiring time, and the success of which was essential 
to the safety of the army in its further progress. Still, 
so little was Wellington's position, military and politi- 
cal, understood in England, even at that time, after all 
the proofs he had given of consummate ability, that 
public clamor was again roused against the mode 
adopted by him for conducting the war. As there 
were no disasters at which to grumble, people talked 
of *^ barren victories,^' because like those of Crecy and 
Azincourt, they brought no territorial acquisitions, for- 
getting then what they have never been weary of 
boastingly proclaiming since, that these victories were 
the best proofs that their army was distinguished by 
the highest military qualities, which, properly directed 
and supported, were capable of achieving the most 
glorious results. So profound was the conviction of 
the immense superiority of the French, both in num- 
bers and in the quality of their troops, that the public 
mind was in a state of feverish anxiety, and many 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 17 

of the stoutest hearts gave way to despair. About 
this period Sir Walter Scott wrote to Mr. Ellis : 
"These cursed, double cursed news (from Spain) 
have sunk my spirits so much, that I am almost at dis- 
believing a Providence ; God forgive me, but I think 
some evil demon has been permitted in the shape of 
this tyrannical monster, whom God has sent on the 
nations visited in his anger. The spring-tide may, for 
aught I know, break upon us in the next session of 
Parliament. There is an evil fate upon us in all we do 
at home or abroad." So Sir James Mackintosh, writ^ 
ing to Gentz, at Vienna : " I believe, like you, in a 
resurrection, because I believe in the immortality of 
civilization, but when, and by whom, and in what 
form, are questions which I have not the sagacity to 
answer, and on which it would be boldness to hazard 
a conjecture. A dark and stormy night, a black series 
of ages may be prepared for our posterity, before the 
dawn that opens the more perfect day. Who can tell 
how long that fearful night may be before the dawn 
of a brighter morrow ? The race of man may reach 
the promised land ; but there is no assurance that the 
present generation will not perish in the wilderness." 
As if to render the situation more gloomy, if possible, 
the Marquis of Wellesley, the brother of Wellington, 
left the Ministry upon the avowed ground that the 
Government would not support the war with sufficient 
vigor. History has stripped his conduct of any such 
worthy motive, and shown that the real trouble was 
his anxiety to supplant Mr. Perceval. At the same 
time, the attack was kept up in the opposite quarter. 
"No man in his senses," said Sir Francis Burdett, 
2 



18 HOW A FEEE PEOPLE 

" could entertain a hope of the final success of our 
arms in the Peninsula. Our laurels were great, but 
barren, and our victories in their effects mere defeats." 
Mr. Whitbread, too, as usual, was not behindhand with 
his prophecies. " He saw no reason," he said, " to alter 
his views respecting peace ; war must otherwise termi- 
nate in the subjugation of either of the contending 
powers. They were both great ; but this was a coun- 
try of factitious greatness. France was a country of 
natural greatness." So, General Tarleton " had the 
doctrine of Mr. Fox in his favor, who wished for the 
pencil of a Cervantes to be able to ridicule those who 
desired to entf^r upon a continental war." '^■■ 

Thus, from ucivcrsal enthusiasm in favor of the 
Spanish war, public opinion, at first manifesting itself 
through the factious spirit of the opposition, at length 
spoke through all its organs, in tones of despondency 

* The following description of the opposition of that day, taken from the 
Annual Register for 1812, bears so striking a likeness to the peculiarities of the 
leaders of an insignificant, but restless faction among us, that, omitting the old- 
fashioned drapery of the proper names, they seem to have sat for the photo- 
graph. " It may be remarked as a most singular circumstance, that those per- 
sons in this country who profess to have the greatest abhorrence of ministerial 
tyranny and oppression, look with the utmost coolness on the tyranny and op- 
pression of Bonaparte. The regular opposition do not mention it with that ab- 
horrence which might be expected from them ; but the leaders of the popular 
party in Parliament go further. They are almost always ready to find an ex- 
cuse for the conduct of Bonaparte. The most violent and unjustifiable acts of 
his tyranny raise but feeble indignation in their minds, while the most trifling 
act of ministerial oppression is inveighed against with the utmost bitterness. 
Ready and unsuspecting credence is given to every account of Bonaparte's suc- 
cess ; while the accounts of the success of his opponents are received with cold- 
ness and distrust. Were it not for these things, the conduct of Mr. Whitbread 
and his friends would be hailed with more satisfaction, and inspire more confi- 
dence with the real lovers of their country ; for they deserve ample credit for 
the undaunted and unwearied firmness with which they have set themselvea 
against abuses and against every instance of oppression." 



CONDUCT A LONG WAE. 19 

and despair, of the situation and prospects of the coun- 
try, and simply because there had not been that sort 
of military success which it could understand, to sus- 
tain and direct it. Universal distrust seized upon the 
public mind ; and had it not been for the heroic con- 
stancy of that great commander, whose task in support- 
ing the Ministry at home was at least as difficult as that 
of beating the French in Spain, the glory of England 
had sunk for ever. 

Yet it happened, as it so often happens in the order 
of Divine Providence, in the moral as in the physical 
world, that the night was darkest just before dawn. 
Amidst all this universal despondency and sinister fore- 
boding, events were jDrej^aring which in a few short 
months changed the whole face of Europe, and forced 
back that torrent of revolutionary success which had 
spread over the whole continent, until it overwhelmed 
the country where it had its source in complete ruin. 
The discussions in Parliament to which we have referred, 
took place in February, 1812. With the siege of Ciu- 
dad Rodrigo on the 18th of January of that year, with 
the fall of Badajoz on the 26th of March, the first bat- 
tle of Salamanca on the 20th of July, and Napoleon's^ 
invasion of Russia in June in the same year, began the; 
downfall of the French Empire. 

Wellington at last reached Madrid in August, 1812', 
more than four years later than he ought to have done, 
according to the strategists of Parliament and the Press. 
This was all forgotten at the moment, so magic a wand 
is held by success. The fickle voice of popular ap- 
plause was again heard, echoing the spirit of confidence 
which his persistent and undaunted conduct had re^- 



20 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

vived 111 the hearts of liis countrymen. His career of 
f ictor}^, however, was destined not to be itncliecked ; 
and when, after his occnpatioli of Madrid, his nnsuC' 
cessful assault upon the Castle of Burgos rendered a 
retreat to the Portuguese frontier and the evacuation 
of the capital a propef military movement, although 
that retreat was compensated for by the abandonment 
of Andalusia by the French, in order to concentrate 
their whole force against him, still the blind multitude 
could not be made to understand it, and began again 
to murmur. 

It is not now difficult to see that the victory at Sala- 
manca was really what the far-seeing sagacity of Mar- 
shal Soult predicted at the time it would become, "a 
prodigious historical event," that it was the pivot on 
which at that time hinged the destinies of England, 
one of those battles of which we see perhaps a dozen 
only in the whole course of history, which are really 
decisive of the fate of empires. It completely unloosed 
the French power in the Peninsula, and prepared the 
way for the great success of Vittoria, the next year, 
which gave the cowp de grace to the French military 
occupation of Spain. It is not our present purpose to 
trace the history of the next campaign, but it is curious 
to observe the effects produced by assured success upon 
that public opinion which had shifted so often and so 
strangely during the progress of this eventful struggle. 
The opposition, as their only hope of escape from po- 
litical annihilation, and thinking to swim with the pop- 
ular current, abused the ministers for not supporting 
Wellington with sufficient earnestness, complaining that 
I'hey had taken the advice which they themselves had 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 21 

SO often and so eloquently tendered. But it was of no 
avail. This wretched charlatanism was too transparent 
to impose upon any one ; and of the great party who 
opposed the war, no one ever after rose to office or 
power in England. It required a whole generation, in 
the opinion of the English constituencies, to expiate the 
faults of those who had sneered at the great Duke, and 
Jbad called the glorious fields of Vimeiro, Busaco, Tala- 
vera, Fuentes d'Onor, Giudad Rodrigo, and Badajoz, 
names which had become associated with the proudest 
recollections of English renown, "mere barren victories, 
equal in their effects to defeats." 

We pass now to the consideration of another class 
of difficulties inherent in the prosecution of every war, 
and generally of far greater magnitude than any other, 
— those connected w^ith the raising of the vast sums of 
money required for the support of military operations. 
In this important matter, if we mistake not, there are 
some striking points of resemblance between the Eng- 
lish experience during the war, and our present situa: 
tion. It is the fashion among many who seek to excite 
the public alarm on this subject from unworthy, and 
sometimes, it may be feared, from treasonable motives, 
to represent the enormous outlay of the nation's wealth 
which is poured out to save the nation's life, as wholly 
unparalleled in history. Yet it may be asserted, with- 
out any fear of contradiction, that England, with a popr 
ulation then little more than half of that which now 
inhabits our loyal States, with resources infinitely less 
in proportion at that time than our own, her manufac- 
turing industry, so far as external outlet was concerned, 
wholly crippled by the operation of the French conti- 



22 HOW A FEEE PEOPLE 

nental system, and her own Orders in C^nncil, expend- 
ed, during every year of the Peninsular war, as large a 
sura as has been required here each year to create and 
keep up the gigantic force now in arms to put down 
the Rebellion. During the five years that the war 
lasted, her average annual expenditure exceeded ninety 
millions of pounds sterling, or four hundred and fifty 
millions of dollars, which is about the same sum which 
is demanded of us. ISTo one, of course, pretends to say 
that this rate of expenditure is not appalling, yet it 
concerns us to know that it is not unprecedented, and 
that these vast amounts have been raised from national 
resources far inferior to our own. It should not be for- 
gotten, also, that they represent the money price of 
England's independence, and if ours is secured by a far 
greater outlay, we certainly are not disposed to- quarrel 
with the wisdom of the investment. 

The question is, how were these immense sums rais- 
ed in England ? The man who would have predicted, 
at tbe commencement of the war with France, that the 
English national debt would at its close exceed one 
thousand millions of pounds sterling, and that the 
country would be able to bear sucli a burden, would 
have been regarded as visionary, and as wild as he 
who in this country, two years ago, might have foretold 
the present amount of our national debt, and hare con- 
tended that, in spite of it, the public credit would re- 
main unimpaired. The difficulty in England of raising 
these vast sums was tenfold greater than it is here, 
Napoleon, looking upon England as the Southern peo- 
ple have been taught to regard us, as a purely commer- 
cial nation, undoubtedly placed more reliance for sue- 



CONDUCT A LONG WAE. 2B 

» 

cess upon the instinct of money getting, which would 
shrink from the pecuniary sacrifices necessary in a pro- 
longed struggle, than upon the mere victories of his 
army, ' Hence he pursued, during his whole career, an 
inflexible purpose of ruining English commerce, and 
by a series of measures known as the Continental sys- 
tem, endeavored to exclude English ships and English 
products from the markets of the world. The effect 
of these measures, although not so serious as he wished 
and had anticipated, nevertheless crippled enormously 
the resources of England just at the period when they 
were most needed. 

Taking the three years before the issuing of the 
Orders in Council, and the vigorous enforcement of the 
Continental system, which were coincident in point of 
time with the commencement of the Spanish, war, the 
average annual exports sank from fifty-seven millions 
to twenty-three millions, taking the average of three 
years after they had been in operation. Taxes were 
laid on at a most burdensome rate. The income tax 
was ten per cent,, and besides, specific war taxes, 
amounting to more than twenty millions a year was 
imposed. Notwithstanding all these taxes, the debt 
increased more than one thousand millions of dollars 
during the Peninsular war. Discontent and violence 
among the laboring classes became universal, and it 
was remarked that the achievement of the greatest vic- 
tories in Spain was celebrated in England " amidst a 
population who had been prevented b}^ the burden of 
taxation on the absolute necessaries of life, from secur- 
ing a livelihood by the strictest industry, and thus pau- 
perism had been generated throughout the land, a pan- 



24 HOW A FEEE PEOPLE 

perisni aggravated by a spirit of pillage, which it re- 
quired a strong military force to repress." Bankruptcy 
and ruin fell upon the trading classes, and absolute ex- 
haustion of the resources of the country seemed almost 
reached. The public stocks had sunk to such a degree 
that the three per cents., which are now always above 
90 per cent., were rarely higher during the war than 
65 per cent., and so depressed at last had the public 
credit become, that the last loan of the Continental 
war, that of April, 1815, was taken by the contractor 
at 53 per cent., and paid for in the depreciated paper 
of the day ; and yet the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
was congratulated even by the opposition for having 
made a " good operation." The Bank was in a state of 
chronic suspension, the buying and selling of gold were 
prohibited to the public under severe penalties, and 
yet every gold guinea which was sent by the' govern- 
ment to the army in Spain (and nothing else would ans- 
wer the purpose of money in that country) cost thirty 
per cent, premium. How England survived all this 
complication of troubles is one of the marvels of his- 
tory, but it is not our purpose to discuss that question. 
The great fact that the money required was somehow 
raised is all that we have to do with at present. When 
we have been at war for twenty years, and are forced, 
in order to raise the means of carrying it on, to submit 
to one tithe of the sacrifices which were endured by 
the English, we may then perhaps begin seriously to 
consider the money value of the Union. 

The lesson which this review of the progress of the 
Peninsular war teaches, is, it seems to us, one of hope 
and encouragement, for if it shows anything, it proves 



CONDUCT A LoiN^G WAE. 25 

clearly that in tlie support of public opinion, and in 
the means requisite to maintain a great army, those 
fundamental essentials of real military success, our 
Government is immeasurably stronger than the Eng- 
lish ever was at any period of the war. It teaches 
also another important lesson, and that is, that there is 
such a thing as public opinion falsely so called, which 
is noisy Justin proportion as its real influence is narrow 
and restricted. One of the most difficult and delicate 
tasks of the statesman is to distinguish the true from 
this false opinion, the factious demagogue from the 
grumbling but sincere patriot, and to recognise with a 
ready instinct the voice which comes from the depths 
of the great heart of the people, in warning it may be 
sometimes, in encouragement often, but always echoing 
its abiding faith in the ultimate triumph of the good 
cause. 

We have confined ourselves in our illustrations to 
the discussion of questions as they affected the success 
of purely military operations, because we feel that liere 
our grand business is to clear away the obstacles, real 
or fancied, which may in any way impair our military 
efficiency. In military success alone, we are firmly con- 
vinced, is to be found the true solution of our whole 
difficulty, the only force which can give vitality or per- 
manence to any theory of settlement. As the matter 
now stands, it is idle to hope for either peace or safety 
until this question of military superiority is unmistak- 
ably and definitely settled. Upon this point, then, the 
increase of our military efficiency, which embraces not 
merely the improvement of the condition of the armyj 
"but also, as we have endeavored to show by Eno-lish 



HOW A FEEE PEOPLE 



examples, and in a greater degree than is oAen suppos- 
ed, the support of the Government in its general poli- 
cy of conducting the war, should the efforts of all those 
who influence public opinion be concentrated. 

There is a certain class of men among us, not very 
numerous, perhaps, but still, owing to their position 
and culture, of considerable influence, who, accustomed 
to find in the European armies their standard of mili- 
tary efiiciency, are disposed to doubt whether a force, 
composed as ours is of totally different materials, can 
accomplish great results. We may admit at once the 
superiority of foreign military organization, the result 
of the traditions of centuries of military experience 
digested into a thorough system, and carried out by 
long trained ofiicers perfectly vei'sed in the details of 
the service. Much inconvenience has necessarily re- 
sulted in our case from the ignorance of Regimental 
Officers, to a greater degree probably, however, from 
a want of proper care and attention on their part to 
the troops when in camp, than from any gross incom- 
petency or misconduct on the field of battle. Instances 
of such misconduct there have undoubtedly been, but, 
considering the number of the officers and their want 
of experience, those instances are extremely rare, and 
when we call to mind the number of officers who have 
fallen, w^hile leading their men in battle, out of propor- 
tion, as it undoubtedly is, with the losses in other wars, 
we may well palliate deficiencies in this respect, out of 
considerations for their heroic gallantry and devotion. 
We do not underrate certainly the value of good offi- 
cers, but history tells us that great victories have been 
achieved by armies who were no better led than ours. 



CONDUCT A LONG WAE. 2T 

The incompetency of his officers was one of Welling- 
ton's standing complaints in Spain. Most of them knew 
absolutely nothing beyond the mere routine of garrison 
duty ; they were all what is technically called " gentle- 
men," for each one had purchased his commission at a 
high price, but they had had no systematic training in 
military schools ; nearly all of them had had no actual 
experience of war, and their average intelligence was 
undoubtedly below that of the men who hold similar 
positions in our army * All accounts agree that at that 
period the scientific branches of the great art of war 
were almost wholly neglected in the British army, and 
such was the happy ignorance of the elements of strat- 
egy, that at a court-martial composed of general offi- 
cers for the trial of Greneral Whitelock in 1808, for his 
failure at Buenos Ayres, it was necessary to explain to 
the court what was meant in military phrase by the 
"right bank" of a river. 

It is said again, by those Who have the standard of 
foreign armies before their eyes, that among our sol- 
diers there is not a proper deference to rank, too 'much 
camaraderie in short, and that this is fatal to discipline. 
But it should be remembered that mea'e formal disci- 

* We have no room to enumerate in detail the complaints made by the Duke 
of the officers of his army. Those who are interested in tie subject may consul) 
Col. Gurwood's 4th volume, pages 343, 346, 352, 363, 38f , 399, and 407. The 
whole story is summed up, however, in the general order occasioned by the dis- 
orderly retreat from Burgos, in which the Duke said " that discipline had dete- 
riorated during the campaign in a greater degree than he had ever witnessed, 
or ever read of in any army, and this, without any disaster, or any unusual pri- 
vation or hardship, that the officers had from the first lost all command over 
their men, and that the true cause of this unhappy state of affairs was to be 
found in the habitual neglect of duty by the Regimental Officers." This is the 
army of which the Ifuke said later, that " with it, he could go anywhere and 
do anything," and, good or bad, it saved Europe — in the English sense. 



28 HOW A TEEE PEOPLE 

pline may he one thing, and the true spirit of discipline 
another, and yet both may answer the same purpose. 
The first may be more showy than the latter, but not 
more valuable to real military efficiency. Everything 
depends upon the character of the soldier who is to be 
governed by it. The British army is composed, as we 
all know, of the refuse of the population, and in the 
war in the Peninsula it was largely reinforced by the 
introduction into its ranks of convicts taken from the 
hulks, who were there expiating infamous offences. 
With such men, motives based on a sense of duty were 
powerless. Drunkenness, theft, marauding, a mutinous 
spirit under privations, and a fierce thirst of license 
which defied all control in the hour of victory, these 
■were the brutal passions which could only be checked 
by the equally brute hand of force. But from such a 
vile herd, made useful only as a slave is made useful, 
by fear of the lash, to the civilized, sober, well educated 
American citizen, animated with the consciousness that 
he is fighting for a great cause, in the success of which 
he and his children have a deep personal interest, and 
who learns obedience because both his common sense 
and his sense of duty recognise its necessity, how im- 
measurable is the distance ! The American volunteer, 
in this respect, has not had justice done to his excel- 
lence. He is certainly a soldier essentially sui generis, 
and when we hear sneers at his want of discipline, let 
us remember that although he may not regard his offi- 
cers as superior beings, yet experience has already 
shown that in the cheerful perforpaance of his new du- 
ties under privations ; in his freedom from those vices 
which in many minds are inseparably associated with 



CONDUCT A LONG WAE. 29 

the very idea of a soldier; in his courage, endurance, 
and steadiness in battle; and, more than all, in those 
higher qualities which are the fruit of his education, 
general intelligence, and love of country, he presents 
himself to us as a figure hitherto wholly unknown in 
military history. 

One of the most cruel statements which party ran- 
cor has circulated in regard to the condition of the 
army is, that the rate of sickness and mortality is ex- 
cessive, and that this is due to the neglect of the 
Government. Fortunately we have the means of show- 
ing that these statements are false. From June 1, 1861, 
to March 1, 1862 — nine months — the annual rate of 
mortality for the whole army is ascertained to be 53 
in a thousand, and the sickness rate 104 in a thousand. 
The returns for the summer campaigns are not yet 
printed, but it will appear from them, that in the army 
of the Potomac on the 10th of June, after the battle 
of Fair Oaks, and while the army was encamped on 
the Chickahominy, the whole number of sick, present 
and absent, compared with the whole force of that 
army, present and absent, was 128 in a thousand., Du- 
ring the stay of the army on the Peninsula it lost less 
than 14,000 men by death, from disease and wounds, and 
the annual sickness rate during the campaign was about 
that which has for some time prevailed in the whole 
army, less than ten per cent, of the whole force. It 
appears, strange to say, that the army was more 
healthy when in the trenches before Yorktown, than 
at any other period of the campaign. Compare this 
with the English experience. We have already said that 
"Wellington lost about one-third of his whole army from 



30 HOW A FllEE PEOPLE 

malarious fever on his retreat from Talavera : on the 
1st of October, 1811, the Anglo-Portuguese army had 
56,000 men fit for duty, and 23,000 sick in hospitals ; 
and in the Crimea, while the annual rate of mortality 
for the whole war was 232 in a thousand, the period 
of active operations, the last three months of 1854 
and the first three months of 1855, shows the fearful 
rate of 711 deaths in every thousand men. 

It cannot' be doubted that to many the most unfa- 
vorable symptom of our present condition is the slow 
progress of our arms. This slowness is more apparent 
than real, for the history of modern warfare scarcely 
shows an instance in which so great real progress has 
been made in the same space of time, and it is mani- 
fest that whenever our Northern soldiers have had a 
chance of fighting the enemy on anything like equal 
terms, they have fully maintained their superiority. It 
is none the less true, however, that public expectation 
in this matter has been much disaj)pointed, and it is 
curious to look at some of the explanations given for 
it. The Prince de Joinville, in his recent pamphlet, 
speaking of the battle of Fair Oaks, and of the neg- 
lect to throw bridges over the Chickahominy at the 
proper time, by means of which the whole rebel army 
might have been taken in flank, and probably des- 
troyed, ascribes the neglect on one page to what he 
calls la lenteur Americaine^ which he seems to think 
always leads our countrymen to let the chance slip of 
doing the right thing at the right time, and again on 
the next to ^'faute d' organisation^ faute de liier archie^ 
faute de lien, qui en resulte entre V dme du chef et 
V a/rmee, lien puissanA j>ui permet d un General de de- 



CONDUCT A LONG WAE. 31 

mander a ses soldats et d^ en obtenir aveuglement ces 
efforts extraordinaires qui gagment les hattaillesJ^ In 
other words, General McClellan, knowing that he could 
gain a decisive victory by laying down half a dozen 
bridges, which, it is stated, were all ready for the purpose, 
actually refused to order his soldiers ^o do it, because 
he was afraid they would not obey his orders. And 
this is the Prince's judgment of an army, which, a 
few weeks later, according to his own account, fought 
five battles in as many days, all, with one exception, 
victories over an enemy at least double its numbers, 
and arrived at its new base on the James River in 
excellent condition, and without the slightest taint of 
demoralization. This illustration shows the absurdity 
of ascribing the want of immediate success to la len- 
teur Americaine^ a quality, by the way, which wc 
learn for the first time, is one of our national charac- 
teristics. 

Among the many causes which might be named, all 
perfectly legitimate, and presenting no obstacle which 
a little experience will not remove, we venture t'o sug- 
gest but one, and that is the character of the early 
military education of our higher officers. The system 
pursued at West Point, although admirable for quali- 
fying officers for the scientific and staff corps of the 
army, seems to fail in teaching the young soldier, what 
is just now the most important quality he can possess 
for command, the character and capacity of volunteer 
soldiers. The system of discipline he has been taught 
is that which governs the regular army, a system mod- 
elled upon the English, which is, with the exception 
of that in use in Russia, the most brutal and demoral- 
izing known in any army in Europe. No wonder, 
therefore, that when our educated soldiere are suddenly 



^2 HOW A FKEE PEOPLE 

placed in higli positions, and with great responsibilities^ 
and wlien they discover that the sort of discipline 
which they have been taught is wholly out of place in 
securing the efficiency of a volunteer army, they are 
led to doubt whether it can ever be made efficient at 
all. These prejjidices, however, are wearing away be- 
fore the test of actual experience. Generals' are grad- 
ually learning that they may confide in their men, even 
for desperate undertakings ; they begin to see in their 
true light the many eminent qualities of the volunteer ; 
and he, in turn, begins to understand something of that 
military system which seemed at first so irksome and 
meaningless to him ; and the advance of the army in 
the essentials of discipline has been proportionably 
rapid. 

There is a good deal of talk about the impossibility 
of conqaering or subjugating the South, which is based 
upon very vague notions of what conquest and subju- 
gation signify. It is surprising to find how even intel- 
ligent men have been imposed upon by this favorite 
boast of the rebels and their sympathizers. A pre- 
tended saying of Napoleon is quoted, that " it is impos- 
sible to prevent any people determined on achieving 
its independence, from accomplishing its purpose ;" and 
it is confidently asked whether any one ever heard of 
the subjugation of twelve millions of people determined 
to be free. We reply, that history, ancient and mod- 
ern, is full of instances of the only sort of conquest or 
subjugation which any sane man proposes shall be sub- 
mitted to by the South. JSTo one thinks it possible or 
necessary, for the purpose in view, to occupy the whole 
South with garrisons, but simply to destroy the only 
support upon which its arrogant pretensions are based, 
namely, its military power. This gone, what becomes 



CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 33 

of all tile rest ? and tills remaining, where is there any 
hope of permanent peace and safety to us ? For what 
is all war, but an appeal to force to settle questions of 
national interest which peaceful discussion has failed to 
settle; and what is an army but only another argu- 
ment, the idti7yia ratio^ which, if successful in decisive 
battles, must give the law to the conquered ? To say 
nothing of instances in ancient history, Poland, Hun- 
gary, and Lombardy, in our day, were just as deter- 
mined to be free as the South is, and quite as full of 
martial ardor ; and certainly Prussia, Spain under the 
Bonaparte dynasty, and the French Empire, are all ex- 
amples of nations which valued their independence, and 
had tenfold the resources for maintaining it which the 
South possesses ; yet the capture of Warsaw, the sur- 
render of Villages, the battles of JSTovara, of Jena, of 
Salamanca, and of Waterloo, respectively, settled as 
definitively the fate of the inhabitants of those coun* 
tries, and their future condition, as if the terms imposed 
by the conquering army had been freely and unani- 
mously agreed upon by the representatives of the peo- 
ple in Congress assembled. And, in like manner, can 
any one doubt, looking at the present comparative re- 
sources -of the two sections, that if we should gain two 
decisive battles, one in the East and the other in the 
West, which should result in the total disorganization 
of the two reb^l armies, and thus enable us to inter» 
pose an impassable barrier between them, we should 
soon hear a voice imploring in unmistakable accents 
peace on our own terms ? It would not be a matter 
of choice, but of necessity ; a simple question of how 
far the progress of exhaustion had been carried, and 
that once settled, and no reasonable hope of success 
remaining, the war would not last a week longer. This 



34 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 

is the experience of all nations, and our Southern rebels, 
notwithstanding their noisy boasting, do not differ in 
their capacity of resistance from the rest of mankind. 
"Hard pounding this, gentlemen," said the Duke of 
Wellington to his officers, as he threw himself within 
one of the unbroken squares of his heroic infantry at 
Waterloo, " hut toe^ll see who can pound the longest ;" 
and the ability of that infantry to " pound the longest" 
on that day settled the fate of Europe for generations. 
Let us bend, then, our united energies to secure, as 
much as in us lies, success in the field, and that success 
gained, we may be sure that all things will follow. Let 
us recognise with confidence as co-workers in this great 
object all, never mind what opinions they may enter- 
tain about the causes of the war and the new issues 
which its progress has developed, who desire in all 
sincerity, no matter from what motive, the success of 
our arms. Upon such a basis, the wider and more 
catholic our faith becomes the better. " Li essentials, 
Unity ; in non-essentials. Liberty ; in all things. Chari- 
ty :" this should be our motto. The only possible hope 
for the South is in our own divisions. Let us remem- 
ber that with success all things are possible ; without 
it, all our hopes and theories vanish into thin air. With 
success in the"^ field, we should not only disarm the re- 
bellion, and rid ourselves for ever of the pestilent tribe 
of domestic traitors by burying them tdee.]) in that po- 
litical oblivion which covers the Tories of the Revolu- 
tion, and those who sneered at the gallant exploits Oi. 
our Navy in the war of 1812, but also force public 
opinion abroad, whose faithlessness to the great prin- 
ciples which underlie all modern civilization has been 
one of the saddest developments of this sad war, to 
exclaim at last, '•''Invidiam gloria superdsti" 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



019 642 636 A 



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